INTRODUCTION

I
T IS STILL too early to evaluate justly Nicolai Hartmann's work and significance. The inclinations and interests of a generation usually are directed towards the seasonable, that is, towards whatever is said or written for and in the present time. The problems of the philosophia perennis, the recurring problems of the centuries, are not as attractive as contemporary interests, but Hartmann devoted himself inexorably to those profound, perennial problems. However, where the progress of knowledge ramified into new directions, Hartmann pointed them out and called for teamwork in researching them.
Hartmann's own work comprises many branches of philosophy. His early works 1 show him deeply anchored in the be- In the works of young Hartmann, who, at that time, was a fervent adherer to the Marburg school, are found propositions which foreshadow his later thinking. They indicate already the philosophical metanoia of Nicolai Hartmann, who was intensively occupied by the search for his own philosophical standpoint. He admits that from 1922 the theory of cognition was the main object of his thought which earlier (in 1915) had brought him into conflict with the position of the School of Marburg. He states:
One of the most responsible questions of a system ... [is] the position regarding the much debated correlation: Subject-object. . . . On its inner disposition depends the problem of the systematic holding especially of idealism and realism with all their subspecies. 3 And then he announces his own conviction:
The classical solution to this question was given by Kant. According to him cognition is only possible when there is something identical in thought and being. But this identical something is not the full object with its infinite determinations. This lies forever as entity beyond what is recognized ... [and] in that datum consists the necessary non-identity of thought and being. 4 general theory on the real categories, which prepared for the Philosophic der Natur/ 2 a compendium on the special categories. Hartmann wrote also an inquiry on immaterial or spiritual reality and its historic-philosophical consequences. This work he called Das Problem des geistigen Seins. 13 To these comprehensive writings Hartmann added numerous smaller studies and essays on systematic and historical problems of philosophy. These were collected and posthumously edited by Frida Hartmann under the title Kleinere Schriften. 14 Some of these essays are evaluated and cited as classical contributions to Western thought.
The progress of Hartmann's philosophy and its condensation in these writings was accomplished in a continuous dialogue with the great forerunners and those contemporaries who left their imprints on the history of ideas.
Hartmann's own philosophy is unchangeably coined by his ontological orientation, that means, by his grasp of reality and his understanding of the cognition of reality. Similar to Aristotle, St. Thomas, Kant, etc., unlike Plato, Augustine and especially the existential philosophers, Hartmann was an absolutely objectively alined thinker. A mentioning of himself scarcely occurs in any of his writings. Hartmann put every philosophical idea into the current of a philosophia perennis of problems, and related it to the already available results of Western Philosophy. 15 His writings show a clear and noble style of which J. Bochenski said : "His works are real models of dispassionate exactitude and scientific comprehensiveness," 16 and which J. Klein praised:
In the works of Ernst Cassirer, the artist among the thinkers of the Marburg School, we find similar achievemc:-tts of perfect style; but his elegance lacks the same depth, clarity and penetration of thought. 17 This study is limited to a problem which has been recognized as central in cognition. Hartmann explored it in his basic and pioneering book, in Grundzuege einer M etaphysik der Erkenntnis. It is the question of the union of the cognizing subject with the recognized object, or the problem of the gnoseological transcendence. It is rooted in the fact that things themselves, when recognized, always remain outside the subject. The intellect never "has " the things, but only impressions, notions, images of things. Hartmann presents this factual condition in an antinomy.
The intellect must transcend itself inasmuch as it grasps something outside itself, that is, inasmuch as it is the recognizing consciousness. But, the intellect cannot transcend itself, inasmuch as it can grasp only its own contents, that is, inasmuch as it is recognizing consciousness. 18 In order to find a solution to this difficulty Hartmann approaches it by a phenomenological analysis of the cognitive act, in which he discovers the gnoseological transcendence.
The term " transcendence " means here the reaching out of the subject beyond itself through its act of cognition 19 and the reaching out of the object beyond itself through its effect on the subject.
The term " gnoseological " modifies the term transcendence, because it is essentially a transcendence in the order of cognition, not a transcendence in the order of being, in contrast to the teaching of those Greeks who held an ontological transcendence of ideas.
The problem of transcendence occurs in many transformations in the history of philosophy. Hartmann had to come to terms with these historical positions. In this study, however, these positions will be mentioned only inasmuch as it seems necessary. No attempt is made to adjust Hartmann's position to any historical school. The intention of this work is to avoid any bending of Hartmann's philosophy towards traditional systems or principles of being and/or of principles of knowing. Where Hartmann's theory does coincide with them it does not seem necessary to point this out; where Hartmann deviates, a bending in favor of traditional principles would be a falsification of Hartmann's teaching.
This study does not claim any other privilege than to present Hartmann as Hartmann from the point of view of the theme. It is expected to draw more attention to a philosopher who, due to contemporary trends, becomes overlooked, but who certainly will survive some of these trends and fertilize the dialogue of future thinkers. This conviction is based upon the fact that Hartmann opens up again the entire wealth of being, its real structures, categories, principles and relations, in objective consideration of their history as well as by thinking, measuring, anticipating within the noetic affluence of the twentieth century.
I. HARTMANN's NOTION oF METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL
" Philosophy does not begin with itself. It presupposes the accumulated knowledge and methodical experience of all sciences as well as the two-edged experience of the philosophical systems of the centuries. From all that philosophy has to learn."
NICOLAI HARTMANN.
One of the most eminent students in the Hartmann circle depicts the philosophical situation during the twenties of this century in terms of his own personal experience:
In order to hear Hartmann I had come to Marburg for a semester. I came with definite expectations. For us younger ones the name Hartmann was a notion characterized perhaps most distinctly by the title of his book Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. We had experienced Kant as the great master of philosophical thought, but at the same time also as the great critic. Kant's idea that metaphysics is impossible on the basis of pure reason was for our generation, as for many previous ones, an intransgressible position. One was used to consider distrustfully everything called metaphysics, and to look at all metaphysical movements rather suspiciously. Although Kant had written the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, and some of us knew that in the opus postumum were even found beginnings and pieces of this metaphysics, nevertheless, the large region of philosophical thought, the metaphysical thinking of all kinds, was orphanized. The theory of knowledge stood before it as a kind of safeguard.
Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition was a theory of knowledge. But this thinker, who was in no way inferior to Kant in critical keenness, and who gave now a coherent theory of knowledge, called his resulting theory metaphysics. Supported by the Kantian inquiry into the foundations of knowledge, Hartmann, in carrying on, proved that there are metaphysical foundations in knowledge itself. Therefore, with this work now we re-experienced what Hartmann certainly had realized by and for himself when he wrote it. It was a dispute with Kant, most of all with the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, from which Hartmann had come. Indeed, the metaphysics of cognition was a work of eruption. Formerly, Kant's teaching had put itself as a bulwark in front of all philosophical efforts dealing with metaphysical issues. With Hartmann's theory a practicable path into the open reappeared. 1
Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition had made the young thinkers listen attentively. Indeed, one came to Mar burg in order to hear Hartmann. This thinker had gone through years of profound study and a controversy with the Marburg logical Idealism. An essential philosophical discussion had taken place in Hartmann's mind with the most important thinkers via Husser! and Scheler back through the centuries, and in reverse again from Plato to the present time. But it was mostly on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel that his own philosophy had matured. From this experience results the statement:
Nobody begins with his own thinking. Everyone finds in his time a gnoseological and problematic situation into which he grows, and out of which he himself begins to search. He accepts the great content of the problems from the historical stage which they have reached. For these problems go through the centuries without changing essentially. They are the same metaphysical problems about which Kant said, they were the fate of reason, because reason can neither reject nor solve them. However, there are many more of them than Kant assumed. 2
Here we find Hartmann strongly impressed. Through this status quo his own philosophic mission became clear to him. He accepted it with all its difficulties. The philosophic idea occupied him constantly. From the historical data he had found, he groped back into the very origin of systems and problems. Clearly he distinguishes both:
In most of its representations philosophy had started from preconceived world-views, into which it subsequently had to fit whatever the contemporary horizon ... assigned to master. The mental constructs which developed this way are then the so-called philosophical systems. They form a whole before they master the pertinent problems and determine the latter from the consequences of the whole. 3 Then Hartmann adds sagaciously:
Philosophy does not consist merely of those constructs. Another kind of mental work moves along with the systems, shrouded by them, namely the efforts advancing along the problems by analyzing them, investigating them, penetrating them. Such work has the tendency to accept nothing but verified proofs. It is the healthy tendency philosophy shares with all the other sciences. Accordingly we have to classify Hartmann himself within the established dichotomy. Viewing his opera omnia one is inclined to see in Hartmann a systematic thinker. He mastered the traditional branches of philosophy, presented his studies translucently and in excellent organization, so that the term " systematic thinker " seems well justified. But system was not Hartmann's starting ground. System was to Hartmann a result achieved, an end, a goal. It was Hartmann's great desideratum, the completion of which seemed never reached, for philosophical knowledge is never finished. System meant to Hartmann the totality and perfection of philosophical knowledge. This idea of " system " had resulted from Hartmann's own philosophical genesis. He strode through reality seeingly, thinkingly, reflectingly, and the more he saw, the more he thought, reflected, and knew. But the more he knew, reflected and thought, the more he perceived. It was Goethe who had stated: "One sees as much as one knows." Hartmann verified this statement especially in regard to his penetration, evaluation and criticism of the history of ideas. For this reason it is so difficult to separate Hartmann's noetic development and philosophical speculation from the development of his works. Both advance step by step and grow organically towards their completion. H. Huelsmann, too, has this impression. He remarks in a footnote of his Methode in der Philosophic Nicolai Hartmanns:
In Hartmann's philosophy as well as in his philosophical development there is no flaw, there is only now and then an accomplished correction.
• Nicolai Hartmann, "Der philosophische Gedanke ... ," loc. cit., p. Such considerations aid to classify Hartmann among the problematic thinkers. This is in accord with his own conviction. He stated about the present era that the time of the preestablished systems is past.
In history Hartmann had discovered that the system thinkers are in the majority. There were the systems of Plotinus and Proclus. The Scholastics of the Middle Ages were almost without exception systematics. A counter-movement occurred only in the late Nominalism. The Modern era produced new systems: Bruno, Spinoza, Wolff, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel bent reality according to their systems, that is, they pre-constructed and attempted to solve the problems by complying with the principles of their preconceived systems.
In the minority group Hartmann counts foremost Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. Thereby he used as criterion that their thinking either does not submit to a system at all, or that it constantly transgresses it or breaks through it. 6 Such a criterion enables us to recognize in Hartmann himself a problem-thinker, and this criterion becomes for him the criterion of true philosophy on the whole:
[Philosophy] does not predetermine. It does not presuppose a world-view to which everything has to adjust, or at least it remains ever ready to revise it. It does not accept prescribed principles. It first searches for them. It begins with the problems which it finds ... in advancing. It is concerned with the solution of problems, but when it cannot solve them, it perseveres with them in exploration and uncertainty. Problems which do not coincide with its calculation, are never rejected. Philosophy remains with them, follows their paths in any direction. Again and again the consequences stemming from the problems may force philosophy to break through established mental constructions. Therefore, it may often appear inconsequent when viewed from the side of the systems. On account of this the two ways separate unequivocally: whether thinking is concerned with the harmony of mental constructs or with cognition. 7 It appears then that all systematic thinking results in something conditioned by time, whereas problem-thinking achieves something supra-temporal, namely, the progress of cognition. Because it starts from the problem, it can advance from problem to problem through the centuries.
Hartmann took an empathic stand regarding this problem development. His works bear witness to the fact that the problems led him to his analysis of the categories, a gigantic intellectual achievement, overdue since Kant's Critique. The problems taught Hartmann also to treasure the Aristotelian aporetics and to revive it in contemporary thought since the philosophical demands of the twentieth century urged him. The problems with their inextricable remainders transmitted from generation to generation were challenging Hartmann also to become the philosopher of the trans-intelligible, of the irrational, that is of what transcends here, now, and perhaps for ever, the human intellectual capacity. But the problems made Hartmann also search for his own position which he finally found as ontologist and metaphysician.
But what did Hartmann actually mean by" metaphysics?"
Did he take the term in its traditional meaning? In the first part of his metaphysics of cognition Hartmann explains his own position. He speaks here of three kinds of metaphysics:
The subject-matter metaphysics, restricted to special fields; the speculative metaphysics; and the metaphysics of problems. The first and the last withstand criticism. But the second kind is contestable. On the whole specialized metaphysics is not more traditional than metaphysics of problems. Both kinds have been transmitted from generation to generation of thinkers through the centuries and have become more developed. But subjectmatter metaphysics is predominantly the province of the system-thinkers, who understand metaphysics as a field with restricted subject-matter circumference. To many of these thinkers ontology was the fundamental science from which cosmology, psychology and natural theology forked off as specialized fields.
Such specialized metaphysics could indeed preserve its meaning even after the specialized domains themselves became either partly very questionable, or partly independent and non-speculative. But once the tradition thereof had been torn down, and other philosophic basic sciences had pushed themselves in the foreground, it would be necessary to set their foundations anew. However, this assignment, even if it were possible to fulfill it, seems not to be ours. 8 Hartmann refutes the traditional view by saying, it is erroneous to think metaphysics begins first of all with a speculation about God and the soul, or about the whole universe. . . . The metaphysical questions indicate themselves rather closely behind the given and the grasped facts. This is valid also for all the non-speculative disciplines. 9 The second kind o£ metaphysics according to Hartmann is the metaphysics which serves more or less as " battlefield o£ speculative systems, o£ their doctrinal constructs and worldviews." 10 Hartmann points out that the specialized metaphysics speculates, too, but it strives £or a solution o£ the problems. In the purely speculative metaphysics, however, the problems "remain basically unsolved, while the speculative hypotheses enjoy greatest freedom." 11 This results in a steady fluctuation o£ contradictory solutions o£ the problems.
The problematic areas remained within their own rights; only the theories, which had dared to approach them, became objects of criticism. Metaphysics as speculation is rightly considered outdated.12
Finally Hartmann asks, what kind o£ metaphysics remains 13 since the mutual chasing o£ the systems seems at the end. In answering this question, Hartmann points to the perennial problems which require further development. It follows, that modern metaphysics can be only a metaphysics o£ problems with "slow progress o£ research" 14 because o£ the always urging but unsoluble remainders o£ problems. Hartmann explains:
The strange phenomenon, however, is that almost in all fields the philosophical basic and central questions are of such a nature. Hence, metaphysics of cognition, too, is understood by Hartmann in this sense. This will become clear from the following mqmry.
II. HARTMANN's METAPHYSICS OF CoGNITION
It is clear that Hartmann belongs to the problem thinkers. What were his relations to other prominent individual representatives of his own group and which problems occupied his mind especially? It is evident that no thinker can be concerned with the entire cosmos of problems. What Hartmann had stated in regard to the plethora of the categories applies also to the multitude of problems:
. . . to outline these . . . is the desideratum of philosophy which is not only beyond the power of the individual thinker to fulfill but transgresses the boundaries of an era. Generations will have to work on it. But they, too, will achieve only what has become mellow in their time. 16 This study is geared towards the gnoseological problems. 15 Nicolai Hartmann, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in op. cit., p. 11: " Das Eigentuemliche aber ist, dass fast auf allen Gebieten die philosophischen Grund und Kernfragen von dieser Art sind. Es sind metaphysiche Fragen im Sinne nicht endgueltig loesbarer Fragen. Die Folge dieses Umstandes ist, dass systematisches Denken notwendig metaphysisches Denken, und systematisch-philosophische Forschung notwendig metaphysische Forschung ist. Es sind die alten, ewigen Aporien mit irrationalem Einschlag, vor die sich dauernd der Mensch gestellt sieht. . . . Diese Sachlage ist die ausschlaggebende. Sie macht die dauernde Grundsituation der Philosophie aus."
16 Nicolai Hartmann, Philosophie der Natur (Philosophy of Nature), p. v: " Diese ... zu entwerfen, ist ein Desiderat der Philosophie, das zu erfuellen nicht nur ueber die Kraft eines Einzelnen, sondern auch wohl ueber die eines Zeitalters hinausgeht. Daran werden Generationen zu arbeiten haben, und bewaeltigen werden sie offenbar auch stets nur das, was in ihrer Zeit spruchreif geworden ist." Therefore, it is necessary to approach only that sector of Hartmann's problem thinking which deals precisely with cognition. Two possibilities exist for research in order to receive answers to the above questions: one begins either with the thinker or with the problems. In both cases one has again an alternative, namely, either one traces the problem from the beginnings to their contemporary state, or one regresses from the present time to the origin of the history of Western philosophy. Hartmann often did the latter. It seems therefore inviting to follow his procedure.
The problems were Nicolai Hartmann's primary concern. Since he had disclosed again the ontological realm with his Meta physik der Erkenntnis he had to screen those problems which were related to cognition and had been registered in the history of ideas. His attitude was the one he pictures in the description of a problem thinker:
The theory of cognition . . . has to proceed critically. Critical procedure, however, is not selection of problems, indeed, such can take place only from the point of view of solubility, but critical procedure is . . . selection of a position. The inquiry has to be critical not in regard to the problem but in regard to the system and theory.H The conviction that the problem of cognition is a metaphysical problem is rooted in Hartmann's theory that cognition deals with the " grasping of the given, that is, cognition is concerned with the objectification of an existent, or, that an existent becomes an object." 18 Approaching cognition under such an aspect, a nexus of problems presents itself. Hartmann lists the following as the fundamental questions of cognition:
I) The problem of the subject-object union, which is the problem of gnoseological transcendence;
2) the problem of apriori and aposteriori knowledge; 3) the problem of the criterion of truth; 4) the question of problem awareness; 5) the problem of the progress of cognition.
All these problems are metaphysical problems in Hartmann's view. But they are aporias, problems which resist a perfect solution, "because they contain an irrational remainder." Therefore, Hartmann seeks to separate within these problems the "transintelligible or the irrational from the intelligible, in order to find for the intelligible part the starting point." 19 Through this method the propositions become gnoseological aporias the ontological foundation of which Hartmann strives to discover. He turns his attention to the metaphysical data of the subject-object relation, which obviously is anchored in the existential sphere .
. . . At any given time only a part of our surrounding world is known, a circle of objects renders itself prominent through the actual limit of objectification which is based relatively upon the noetic condition of the subject. However, beyond this there lies an unlimited zone of the transobjective, that is of the unknown. Since the limit of objectification is moving during the noetic process, the question arises, whether it is capable of boundless shifting. This has to be denied, for the phenomenon of the unintelligible-for-us is demonstrable. It follows, that there must exist a second boundary, the boundary of objectification or recognizability (intelligibility). Obviously this border must be fixed for it is established by the kind and disposition of our apparatus of cognition. 20 This condensed ontological account of Hartmann's theory of cognition points then to the " transintelligible " beyond the limits of objectification, for there is a difference whether something is unknown or unknowable. Hartmann deals then with the " affirmative notion of the thing-as-such," with the removal of its aporias, and, finally he demonstrates the irrational given in the object of cognition and in the categories.
All this shows that Hartmann has learned from his philo- Thereby we do not stop at trivialities for Hartmann truly was concerned with the great problems of the great thinkers, these he pursues into their origins. This study will deal in detail with the first problem, the problem of the gnoseological transcendence. Since there can be no genuine understanding of the work of Hartmann on this problem without an appreciation of his methodology, the general lines of his notion of method must first be outlined.
III. HARTMANN's CoNCEPT OF METHOD
Approaches into such a depth of problems require a suitable means, a method by which success can be expected. What was Hartmann's attitude in regard to method and which method did he choose for his philosophical inquiries? In continuous mental dialogue with the centuries of thought and in view of the various means used by the thinkers he says:
... Cognition does not stop. It does not only .advance in its content by enlarging and deepening its world-view, it moves in another sense, too. Cognition changes its own procedure. It learns to work with other methods, it even creates and invents such tools and improves and polishes them. 21 In the historical advancement of philosophy not only the transitoriness of projected world-views and systems are found, but also lasting achievements of cognition and with them arises the question how to grasp, how to preserve and advance them. An answer is possible if, in all these achievements, a coherence can be discovered which outlasts the opposition of systems and historical eras and which points beyond all these limita-tions. In such a coherence, then, lies the possibility and overture for the epigone 22 to distinguish between truth and error within the transmitted ideas and systems. In order to augment the efficiency of the thinker it becomes necessary that a methodical procedure be acquired which helps the epigone not only to escape the relativity of his own time-conditioned views and interpretations, but also in order to overcome these views, if they are untenable. Hence the assignment of the individual thinker is to recognize the content of the problems provided by the millenia. He must rediscover these problems. He must grasp their meaning and importance in order to be able to evaluate the work achieved by his predecessors, and to make use of valuable achievements. Therefore, the serious philosopher faces the task to continue the inquiry where the transmitted problems and propositions demand it. Of course, such a work challenges mental efforts. The philosopher must truly be a researcher, one who probes and wrestles with tradition and the given reality. He must be a systematic thinker, that is, one whose problem-thinking discovers the continuity of thought, of questions and of problems and who works with it, hence, prolongs it and passes it on to the coming generations. Hartmann believed that the important thing is not the variety of attitudes and interpretations, but the methodical basis, that is, a forcing power of cogni-•• Cf. Heinz Huelsmann, Die Methode in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns, p. 21: "Hartmann often used the word epigone in order to express his own relation and the relation of his contemporaries to the great thinkers in history." Cf. also note 2, ibid.: " The word epigone is not an arbitrary term. It means a very exact relationship. First of all it signifies the descendant and the late-hom. In it is also a point of modesty and humility, of respect for the greatness of the past. However, epigone means also to be the older in the objective spirit, for the epigone is enabled without own merits but through his historical place where he stands to harvest fruits ripened in history. Thus the epigone has possibilities, provided by the historical development, by the progress of the sciences, which put him in a more advantageous situation than the thinkers of the past. It is informative, too, that this term occurs especially in connection with the method. It allows us to presume that Hartmann by using this term intended to determine his own place in the history of ideas." tion, a consequential attitude determined by its relationship to the object and to the labor already achieved by the past. 23 Thus method is not an arbitrary matter dependent only on the choice of the thinker who uses the method.
It is prescribed by the species of the object. For its own procedure there is only one alternative given: to meet or to fail the object. The object is met only by a proper method. And to be sure, the object can be failed (missed) in many ways. It is truly comprehended by the correct way. 24 Here Hartmann refers to Aristotle who explained in regard to his own philosophical predecessors: " In proceeding . . . the object itself pointed the way for the researchers and forced them to continue the inquiry." 25 From this it is clear that method has to adjust to the object. If one approaches an object with a heterogeneous method, the object keeps itself closed up, or becomes complicated and appears unconquerable. But as soon as the homogeneous method is found and applied, the object itself opens up, appears simple, lucid, and soluble. This insight caused Hartmann to define method as the manner by which an object is approached. The method is practical when it commences where the object shows its open assailable sides. Whoever proceeds otherwise will experience that the object escapes. It is wrong to think that one can approach one and the same object by so and so many different methods. Hartmann admits that there are various methods, but he cautions the user, for the choice of the method is determined by the object.
Another surprising aspect of the theory of Hartmann 27 is that methods themselves do not result from mere pondering about method. Methods originate rather through "the full devotion to the object." 28 In his earlier work " Systematische Methode," 29 Hartmann distinguishes three principal methods: the transcendental method, the descriptive method, and the dialectical method. Later Hartmann speaks of "method-momenta" which are continuously interrelated. 30 Some of these interlacing moments are the phenomenological-descriptive, the analytic-retro-conclusive, the dialectic-synthetic points. Other methodical elements follow from these, complement these and allow a synopsis of the different levels of methodical procedures. This synthesis leads to a theory of methods which can be detected and proved in most of the teachings of outstanding philosophers. However, since there are many thinkers and many problems, the methods applied at any given time must vary.
Method and content are not neutral to one another. A special content demands a special method. How should one be able to prescribe a methodical type if all the philosophical potential of the method lies in its elasticity and adaptability? This fact becomes especially important when one tries to tailor such a method for a definite type of system. A systematic method obtained that way is then nothing else but an instance of censorship which prevents the admission of what had not been curtailed previously by the system. 31
Methode, die ihn dort anpackt, wo er seine freiliegenden Angriffsflaechen hat. Wer ihn anders anpackt, dem gleitet er durch die Finger durch. Es ist ein lrrtum zu meinen, man koenne diesselbe Sache so oder auch anders in Angriff nehmen; man "kann " freilich, aber man bekommt sie nicht zu fassen. The viewpoint o£ Hartmann, that the system is considered the result, the end, the goal o£ philosophical reasoning, has been explained. Hartmann sees the method working towards such an end. However, method, unlike system, is not the end but the beginning o£ a philosophy. It has to serve as guide in all actual philosophizing. This does not mean that-before using any method-the philosopher has to penetrate method fully beforehand. Often such penetration comes aposteriori through reflection upon the £unction and achievement o£ the method. And with the aposteriori insight there develops the method awareness. For instance, the final methods of Formal logic are present in practically every thinking. But not every thinking knows about their presence ... and if it does know about the methods, thinking does not become more methodical by knowing about them. 32
From this statement o£ a phenomenon it follows that a certain methodological apriority is generally given. Already in the pre-Socratic philosophy a method was used. But a " reflection upon its own procedure " was completely absent. Plato and Aristotle illuminate later the immanent methodical moments. They show that knowledge o£ content must precede knowledge o£ methods, £or without the preceding of a philosophy of nature geared . . . towards a content, that is, without the application of method (at first naive and unconscious) posterity would not have been able to find the method. Research of method presupposes experience of method. 33 "Denn Methode und Inhalt sind nicht indifferent zu einander. Jeder besondere Inhalt verlangt eine Besonderung der Methode. Wie also kann man einen Methodentypus vorzeichnen wollen, waehrend doch aile philosophische Leistungsfaehigkeit der Methode in ihrer Dehnbarkeit und Anpassungskraft liegen muss? Besonders schwer aber faellt solch ein Vorwurf ins Gewicht, wo man diesen Methodentypus noch dazu auf einen bestimmten Systemtypus zuschneiden will, so dass systematische Methode dann nichts anderes ist als eine Zensurinstanz, die ins System nicht einlaesst, was nicht vorher " systematisch " zugestutzt ist." 32 Nicolai Hartmann, " Die systematische Methode," in op. cit., III, p. 23: " ... die Schlussmethoden der formalen Logik (sind) schlechthin in allem Denkeu vorhanden. Aber nicht alles Denken weiss urn dieses Vorhandensein; und wenn es darum weiss, so wird es dadurch im allgemeinen urn nichts methodischer."
In other words, method, too, can become object of study, but before it can be analyzed it has to be. Method becomes lucent by applying it and becomes objectified only after its application by the methodologist. Thus the apriority of method conditions its application.
The method of cognition is the very first of all conditions; but the recognition of the method which comprehends the method of cognition is the very last of all insights. 34 Based on these insights Hartmann himself uses the methods in a skillful manner in his philosophy. He approaches the problem of method by formulating the aporia of method as follows:
How can method exist in a vital subject-matter research, and, what is more, how can it function if there is no guiding methodical awareness in the intellect? 35 In this formulation of the aporia the determining factors of the method are given: the object, the subject-matter, and the intellect.
The method is prescribed by the assailable surface which the object shows. But it is not determined by the object alone, for it is just as much influenced by the structure of the cognitive apparatus. 36 In the method then two categories meet which Hartmann considers given and necessary in every process of cognition: the category of being in the object, " which can be taken from any level of the hierarchy of being," 37 and the spiritual category of cognition or knowledge in the subject, which constitutes the counterpart of the first. The existential realm and the gnoseological realm indeed affect the method also. Hence, method too, becomes relationally determined by "the coordination . . . which connects cognition with the content of its object." 38 In philosophy this coordination is the point of departure for the selection of a method, for philosophy has to ask either for a problem or because of a problem. The content of the unknown area in an object is expressed in the problem. This unknown area has to become disclosed through the chosen method. Therefore, by its very nature the method is the path on which the objects of the real categories or the problems of reality move into the noetic sphere. In the noetic sphere then the real categories are represented by their corresponding cognitive equivalents obtained by a suitable method. Hence, in the entire process of cognition method is needed, for the problem awareness in the subject does not remain static. Problem awareness urges towards problem solution by investigation of possible answers. In this phenomenon Hartmann recognizes an essential methodical element:
Such an investigation reflects the finding of a method, although it is not yet an explicit method awareness. But it is an object awareness stemming from an awareness of a prevailing problem situation whereby the chance of possible advancement is subjected to deliberations because of the data. 39 In such deliberations the methodical design develops and becomes seen for one needs the total apparatus of methods, ... the direct analytical ascent from the concrete ... , the dialectical synthesis ... , and the hierarchic perspectives of the strata. And whatever the method may be that is first used one of the other methods must join it for the sake of complement and controJ.4° Among all the possible methods Hartmann considers the transcendental method (also called the critical method by Kant, because it involves an analysis of the conditions and limits of knowledge) the proper philosophical method. It searches for the ultimate principles and connects in the process of knowledge the object with the subject, real categories with the categories of cognition. By means of the transcendental method the philosopher proceeds from the actual real to the conditions of the possibilities of the given. Therefore, Hartmann evaluates this method as the fundamental step towards the finding of universal principles and, therefore, a necessary requirement of objective cognition and of philosophic problem awareness.
In the gnoseological situation the apriori or universal principles are not the first, but the last recognized elements, or precisely the unkown and, therefore, searched for factors of a problem. The problematic character of this situation intensifies in philosophy because philosophy has to find out the laws of these universal principles. Therefore, it must be understood that this kind of method obviously rests upon a retro-conclusion (Rueckschluss): the ontological prius becomes simultaneously in the gnoseological order the posterius. 41 The transcendental method then consists actually in this 
2.5
kind of procedure. The usual order becomes reversed for the general direction of inference is normally a descending motion deductively proceeding from general principles to the given particulars. In the transcendental method, however, there is an ascent from the object to the conditioning principles.
In this opposition of the directions and in the simultaneous penetration of both, the idea of a system of methods becomes clearly apparent. In such a system, however, the hypothetical method, the one which provides the conclusion aposteriori in the research of principles is the proper philosophical method. The principles of philosophy lie in another sphere than the principles of mathematics and physics. They lie on a higher level and form, as it were, an upper floor in the division of the sciences. They in turn are again conditions of scientific principles. For the latter become in philosophy a problem, an object, the ultimate principles of which philosophy has to search for. Therefore, the sphere of the philosophical objects, too, is transferred to a higher level. . . . Only the upper link of the concatenation, the inference of the philosophical categories, is a transcendental conclusion in the strict sense. The problem of the principles appears here in a more condensed, more powerful form; we deal with the highest, first principles. Conclusions leading beyond this level are not possible. For on the level of first principles ( archai in the strict sense) the inference depends methodically on itself alone and is the only entrance to the principles. In this uniqueness of the philosophical conclusion (aposteriori) there lies the special characteristic of the transcendental method as an exclusively philosophical procedure. 42 42 Nicolai Hartmann, "Die systematische Methode," in op. cit., p. 29-31: "In dieser Entgegengesetztheit der Richtungen und dieser gleichzeitigen Durchdringung beider findet sich deutlich der Gedanke eines Systems der Methoden angelegt, innerhalb dessen aber die hypothetische, als die der rueckschliessenden Prinzipienforschung, die eigentlich philosophische Methode bildet. . . . Die Prinzipien, mit denen es Philosophie zu tun hat, liegen in einer anderen Sphaere als die mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen. Sie liegen eine Stufe hoeher, bildengleichsam ein oberes Stockwerk zu ihnen. Sie sind selbst wiederum Bedingungen fuer die Wissenschaftsprinzipien. Denn diese werden auf philosophischem Gebiet selbst wiederum zum Problem, das heisst zum Gegenstand, dessen Prinzipien es zu finden gilt. Auch die Gegenstandssphaere ist also hier eine Stufe hoeher hinauf verlegt. . . . Ein transzendentaler Schluss im strengen Sinne ist nur das obere Glied der Schlusskette, der Schluss auf die philosophischen Kategorien. Die Prinzipienfrage erscheint hier in verdichteter, potenzierter Form; es handelt sich urn die obersten, ersten Prinzipien, ueber die hinaus kein Rueckschluss mehr fuehren kann . . . .
Another procedure which provides an object and outlines the content of the object is used by the natural sciences. This procedure is the descriptive method. The descriptive method does not predicate anything about the cognitive validity, correctness, necessity of the object, and it does not inquire into its principles. Nevertheless, this method is useful for all the empirical sciences and it aids the transcendental method too. In this study reference to this method will be made when we deal with Hartmann's method in his M etaphysik der Erkenntni8.
In one point we may hope to advance further than the old fronts the philosophical object or problem. In description, however, the object is outlined, observed, limited, described.
In a third method, the dialectical method, the principles of the objects or problems become interwoven. Hence the vertical direction of the transcendental method becomes horizontalized. The static concept-resulting from the transcendental method -becomes through the dialectical method a dynamic one, for through this method's synthesis the conceptual identification, stabilization and determination become related to other concepts, objects and problems. Therewith the functional character of both of these methods becomes evident. This then is the foundation for the coherence, coordination, categorization of a system: . . . by ascending with the transcendental method to the highest principles, it seems at first as if each category were something isolated and for itself inasmuch as its relativity consists in the relation to the object only. . .. the system would be nothing but the sum of these single fundamental concepts-as valid as they may be. Dialectics teaches the reverse. A single category is nothing without its relation to other categories. Without any other categories a single category cannot even be defined. Hence, there Denn nur dort, wo es sich urn "erste Prinzipien" (archai im strengen Sinne) handelt, ist der Rueckschluss methodisch ganz auf sich selbst gestellt, ist er der einzige Zugang zu den Prinzipien. Und in dieser Einzigkeit des Rueckschlusses liegt das Eigentuemliche der transzendenten Methode als eines bloss philosophischen Verfahrens." IS still something that is superior to the principles without being their genus: the relation between the principles, their reciprocity, their dependence on one another. That means, each category is conditioned through all the others, is determined by the others, but at the same time, it is co-conditioning and co-determining all the other categories. It is then clear: this universal, reciprocal relationship is the idea of a system, or the system of the categories is the logical prius of the single categories. However, a system cannot be defined as the sum of the categories which the system comprises. The system is more than their sum total, for it is the unity and the essence of their relations. Thus it is a dynamic system of relations and not a static system of concepts. 43 This study is not intended to be a detailed analysis of methods. .Method is viewed only within the limitation given by Hartmann's general theory of method. Therefore, the above sketch of the principal methods occurring in Hartmann's thought seems sufficient, especially since method plays a part in the analysis of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition . .More insight into the problem of method within Hartmann's philosophy can be obtained from H. Huelsmann's excellent work,
Die Methode in der Philosophic Nicolai Hartmanns.H
We have now to investigate how Hartmann used his methodical insights in his theory of cognition. 43 Nicolai Hartmann, "Die systematische Methode," in op. cit., p. 45-46: " Steigt man mit der transzendentalen Methode rueckschliessend zu den Prinzipien auf, so scheint es zunaechst class jede Kategorie fuer sich etwas ist und ihre Relativitaet nur in dem Verhaeltnis zum Gegenstande hat. Das System ist dann nichts als die Summe dieser einzelnen, fuer sich vollgueltigen Grundbegriffe. Dialektik lehrt das Umgekehrte. Die einzelne Kategorie ist nichts ausserhalb der Beziehung zu den anderen Kategorien. Sie ist ohne diese nicht einmal begriffiich fixierbar.-Es gibt also hier noch etwas, was den einzelnen Prinzipien uebergeordnet ist, ohne doch ihr Oberbegriff zu sein; das ist die Beziehung zwischen ihnen, ihre Gegenseitigkeit, ihre Gebundenheit aneinander, welche besagt, class jede durch die anderen aile bedingt und bestimmt ist, und dennoch zugleich Bedingung und Bestimmungsgrund aller anderen ist. Diese allseitige Beziehung, diese Wechselbeziehung, ist aber nichts anderes als die Systemidee. Das System der Kategorien ist also das logische prius gegenueber der einzelnen Kategorie. Das System ist nicht definierbar als Summe der Kategorien; es ist mehr als ihre Summe, es ist die Einheit und der Inbegriff ihrer Beziehungen. Es ist dynamisches Beziehungssystem, nicht statisches Begriffssystem."
Hartmann comes from the Marburg School. The goal of this Neo-Kantian school was to investigate the nature of knowledge and to provide the theory with new philosophical foundations. Hartmann made this goal his own, only his intention transcended the Mar burg aim, for he gave to the theory of cognition a realistic level in proving its metaphysical anchorage.
In regard to the gnoseological problem on the whole Hartmann's method led him to three major approaches. First, Hartmann attempted to refute positions opposed to the phenomena of cognition. This showed him the limitation and determination of the proper gnoseological problem areas. Having found these he was able to uncover the roots of cognition in the antic realm. 45 On this path the question of the scientific locus of cognition occupied the thinker. Is cognition, properly speaking, a probblem and/or object of psychology or of logic? Hartmann found that none of these disciplines can explain the phenomenon of cognition. Therefore, the study of the entire field must be divided into theoretical problem spheres in accordance with the areas of the data. First, the subject in itself presents a closed psychological sphere. Another one is the ideal logical sphere that corresponds to the given field of the logical structures. Finally there is the total antic sphere of reality .... 46 In Hartmann's philosophy these spheres exist for themselves, that means they are distinct and independent from the subject. There is, for instance, the logical sphere as such with its ideas, judgments and conclusions, which show " even a certain independence from the various levels of cognition." 47 Then, confronting this sphere, there is the sphere of the psychic acts •• H. Huelsmann, op. cit., p. 116. •• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege einer Metaphysik, p. £13: " ... die Gesamtbetrachtung ... in Problemsphaeren der Theorie spalten, entsprechend den Gebieten der Gegebenheit. Das Subjekt bildet hier in sich selbst eine geschlossene psychologische Sphaere der Theorie; dem Gebiet der logischen Strukturen muss eine Sphaere der logisch idealen Theorie entsprechen; die ontisch reale Gesamtsphaere erfordert ein Gebiet ontologischer Betrachtung." "Nicolai Hartmann, Aufbau der realen Welt, ed. 1949 p. 175. within the cognitive process. These acts function in accord with the content of cognition as acts of perception, ideation, intuition. Hence, these acts constitute a sphere of their own, namely, "the sphere that supports spiritual being, for spiritual being depends on psychic being." 48 Consequently, the psychic sphere is the primary, the logical sphere is the secondary sphere, the specific phenomena of which integrate unnoticeably, therefore the tendency of the theory of cognition to display preference either for the one or for the other and turn either into a kind of logism or of psychologism. The proper orientation is obtained only by strict consideration of the transcendental nature of the gnoseological relation. 49 This required " proper orientation on the transcendence of cognition" was observed by Hartmann himself in the methodical reduction of cognition to being (" methodische Selbstueberfuerhrung der Erkenntnis ") by means of the phenomenological method. The procedure of Hartmann, however, applies a methodical correction to the approach of recent philosophical theory.
The phenomenon of cognition must be described in such a manner that the coherence of its essential characteristics as a whole becomes seen and that through this coherence a guarantee is given for its completeness. We possess the method of such an essential description today in the procedure of phenomenology. This recent philosophical theory has already brought forth a multitude of important analyses of essences. However, in the field of cognition, . . . it adhered almost exclusively to the logical sphere and to parts of the psychological sphere of the phenomena. A phenomenology of cognition as essential analysis of the metaphysical aspects in the phenomenon of cognition as such is not yet made. It needs to be newly outlined from its very origin. . . . It can be antici- 48 Ibid.
•• Ibid., p. 176: "Daher die Tendenz der Erkenntnistheorie entweder nach der einen oder nach der anderen Seite zu entgleisen, entweder einem Logismus oder einem Psychologismus zu verfallen. Die eigene Linie in ihr ist ueberhaupt nur im strengen Sichhalten an den Transzendenzcharakter der Erkenntnisrelation durchfuehrbar." pated that the phenomenology of cognition has to become an independent science." 50 Obviously, this correction makes Hartmann's approach radically different from Husserl's method. Huelsmann wisely allows Hartmann to speak for himself about the kind and degree of difference:
It seems here preferable not to speak in general of "essential difference or deviation" but to consider Hartmann's own judgment on this matter: He says, " Our analysis of the phenomenon of cognition deviates in one aspect from the phenomenologists. They exclusively adhere to the immanent elements of the phenomenon and do not grant to the transcendent element its own way. This is not a mere consequence of their method, but rather a partiality of their interest in the phenomenon ... or a remnant of a fixed prejudice. Phenomenology today sees itself handicapped in its own development by the limitations of a philosophy of immanence which in last analysis rests upon an idealistic prejudice. This restriction is avoided by our analysis of the phenomenon of cognition. The transcendence of the object of cognition definitely belongs to the phenomenon and must be described. Even the corrected phenomenological method was only the beginning of the process of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition. From Aristotle he acquired an appreciation and mastery of aporetics, or of the pure science of problems. In Aristotle, Hartmann discovered also the method to investigate the problems as such before treating them theoretically and to see them independently from possible attempts of solutions, that is, to distinguish the unknown from that which is comprehended and to elaborate the difficulties and contradictions of the given phenomena for their own sake. 52 This Aristotelian procedure served Hartmann immediately as a model, but Hartmann remained independent in his approach, for in Aristotle's method, too, Hartmann discovered deficiencies:
In one point we may hope to advance further than the old aporetics. The latter is not based on an analysis of the phenomenon. It is not supported by descriptive preparation which clearly is distinguished from the analysis. Therefore, the old aporetics suffers a certain lack of organization. Observing more critically, one finds in Aristotle some phenomenological motives in the midst of aporetics. The very limiting of the problem requires a start from the facts. If these facts are not determined beforehand, then it becomes necessary to assure them step by step. 53 However, through such a procedure the coherence of the method suffers from many excursions and, certainly, the understanding is rendered more difficult. Hartmann advances here from the subjective element to the objective element, from the ideal to the real, from the purely psychological functional phenomenon to the ontic phenomenon. His intention is to show the pure basis of knowledge in which his theory of cognition is rooted.
Thus the general movement of Hartmann's methodological procedure can be summarized in three steps:
1. The phenomenological description of the gnoseological data is presented. 2. The problem of cognition in general is focused and analyzed into its aporias. 3. It concludes in a theory or a treatment of the problems.
The first step presupposes a very important principle in Hartmann's approach to cognition which must be considered in more detail: the principle of maximum data.
IV. HARTMANN's PRINCIPLE
OF THE " HIGHEST PossiBLE MAXIMUM oF DATA " Hartmann, a phenomenologist sui generis, begins the approach to all the problems he deals with in the gnoseological realm by a descriptive, practical disclosure of the phenomena. He is aware of his own criticism of the motto of Scienticism: 55 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 48-49: "der transzendierende Charakter der Bestimmung des Subjekts durch das Objekt gilt nicht nur fuer konkrete Dingerkenntnis, sondern schlechthin fuer aile Gegenstandserkenntnis. Das Gegenueber bleibt unaufhebbar, auch wenn es kein raumzeitliches ist. Auch der ideale Gegenstand (etwa ein mathematischer Satz), ja selbst ein spezifisch subjektives Gebilde (eine Gesinnung, ein Gefuehl), ist, sofem es Gegenstand des erkennenden Subjekts wird, diesem unaufhebbar gegenueber und insofem transzendent. Der erkannte Gegenstand geht auch hier nicht ueber in das Erkenntnisgebilde, sondem bleibt, was er unerkannt war. . . . Ein mathematischer Satz wird nicht wahrer oder unwahrer dadurch, class er erfasst wird, eine Gesinnung nicht anders dadurch, class sie durchschaut wird. In dieser Unabhaengigkeit allein und nicht in einem psychologischen Aussen gegenueber dem lnnen des Subjekts, !iegt der allgemein gnoseologische Sinn der Transzendenz." Orientation on mathematics and on the mathematized sciences of nature. 56 The last consequence of this motto necessarily results in " a caricature of the phenomenon of cognition." 57 Hartmann decides that if any orientation on science should be considered for the theory of cognition, then " it ought to be obtained in equal proportion from all these sciences." 58 But that, too, seems insufficient for in doing so the entire domain of scientific cognition becomes eliminated. Besides, " the factum of cognition is not only inexhaustible by the factum of the sciences but becomes also distorted by it." 59 Therefore, Hartmann demands that scienticism is confronted with a healthy anti-scienticism which again is not allowed to dominate. The confrontation must be regulated: "A certain distrust in both of these positions is fruitful. Their suspension gives security to completion." 60 But is such a widening of the realm of orientation a nonphilosophical attitude? The methodical scientific doubt takes as little as possible for granted. The scientific method is ruled by "the device of the minimum of data." 61 Descartes, for example, accepted as given only one point, the "cogito." Fichte accepted as jumping-board the "active Ego ('I') " only. But if it were possible to deduct from one point or from one proposition the plethora of the content of cognition, those thinkers would be justified. However, this hope has long proved delusive. It rested upon the most monstrous self-illusion of philosophy since each one of these deductions showed a surreptitious obtainment of the manifold content which previously had been excluded by the elimination of data. In reality the plenty of the content does not flow from the As is well known, the " device of the minimum of data " led the logical idealists to the extreme position which finally refuses to admit that anything is given. They considered everything a question or problem. Such attitude urges us to ask whether at least the question is given. For if the question is given, then a determination of the content is given. If that were denied, the problems would no longer be distinguishable among themselves. The intuitivistic camp of Positivism offered the antithesis to the idealistic thesis, namely "everything (all) is given." If this antithesis were true, then all theory, all speculation and thinking of philosophy would become unnecessary for this antithesis indirectly declares the natural ratiocination of human reason superfluous. Both of these extremes blur the meaning of the concept of givenness (data). This meaning is rooted in the fact that in all the mental activities is found something which is a clearly distinct basis in contrast to that which has to be discovered. 63 " Given" is only a part of the whole. Therefore, the "too much " and the " too little " of data demand a balance. Hartmann ponders:
In the "too-much-of-givenness," at least, the possibility exists that the error becomes balanced; an erroneous assumption is con-62 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 41: "Waere es moeglich aus dem einen Satz die Mannigfaltigkeit des Erkenntnisinhalts zu "deduzieren," so behielten diese Denker recht. Diese Hoffnung hat sich Iaengst als truegerisch erwiesen. Sie beruhte auf der ungeheuerlichsten Selbsttaeuschung der Philosophie, indem aile solche "Deduktion" auf die Erschleichung eben jenes mannigfaltigen Inhalts hinauslaeuft, der durch die Beschraenkung der Gegebenheit ausgeschlossen war. Die Inhaltsfuelle fliesst eben in Wirklichkeit nicht aus der faelschlich verleugneten Masse alles uebrigen Gegebenen, die gewollt oder ungewollt dem deduzierenden Bewusstsein eben doch zur Verfuegung steht." 63 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 42: "Verwischen den Sinn des Gegebenheitsbegriffs. Denn dieser wurzelt eben darin, dass es in aller Gedankenarbeit etwas gibt, was sich als Ausgangsbasis vom Gesuchten und Aufgegebenen deutlich unterscheidet. Das Gegebene ist ... gerade nicht das Aufgegebene, sondern ein anderes." fronted with other data which correct the assumption. The continuous revision of the premises by looking back step by step is the only criterion available in the question of givenness.
But in the " too-little-of-givenness," the danger of the embezzlement of problems exists. . . . A problem once refuted does not return by itself. For unnoticed, but simultaneously with the selection, the bias of the position occurs and excludes forever the once excluded. The " petitio principii " of the position, the most ordinary of all errors of philosophical systems is fundamentally an error in regard to the data, the one of the elimination of data. To approach the problems with a prejudice equals a predetermination of their solution. 64 Such thoughts led Hartmann to the " device of the largest possible maximum of data," for it suits the critical attitude of the thinker and the approach to the phenomenological analysis of the problem. 65 This chosen device permits firstly to return again and again, and to go beyond, the held and the possible positions; secondly, to accept the data for the time being without screening. The phenomena as such ought to be taken as equally valid by the phenomenological analysis that follows from the fact that phenomenology is concerned neither with the theory nor with the formulation of any problem. 66
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 42: " Bei einem " Zuviel an Gegebenheit " besteht wenigstens die Moeglichkeit, dass sich der Fehler wieder ausgleicht; einer falschen Annahme treten andere Gegebenheiten gegenueber, au denen sie sich aufheben kann. Die bestaendige, von Schritt zu Schritt zurueckblickende Revision der Praemissen ist ohnehin das einzige Kriterium, das es in der Gegebenheitsfrage gibt. Bei einem " Zuwenig an Gegebenheit" aber besteht die Gefahr der Problemunterschlagung. . . . Ein abgewiesenes Problem kehrt von selbst nicht wieder. Denn unbemerkt schleicht sich zugleich mit der Auslese die Vorentscheidung ueber den Standpunkt ein, und der Standpunkt schliesst das einmal Ausgeschaltete aus. •• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 43: " erstens, je und je zurueckzugreifen hinter moegliche und gewonnene Standpunkte, Zweitens, Gegebenes vorerst ohne Auslese anzunehmen, da fuer die Phaenomenanalyse die Phaenomene an sich gleichwertig sein muessen, steht " die Phaenomenologie . . . ja nicht nur diesseits der Theorie, sondem auch, diesseits aller Problemstellung."
